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Raluca Bejan, University of  Toronto
Srećko Horvat and Slavoj Žižek, Ce vrea Europa? Uniunea şi Necazurile cu Ea [What
does Europe want? The European Union and its Troubles] (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2015)
The essays contained in this book alternate between Srećko Horvat and Slavoj
Žižek. The book opens with a foreword by Alex Tsipras, Greece’s current Prime
Minister and leader of  the Syriza party, and concludes with his interview as mod-
erated by the two writers. The authors’ ideas flow and build upon each other;
hence this review does not take a chapter-by-chapter approach. It rather discusses
the topics thematically, on an argument-by-argument basis, without a clear demar-
cation of  who said what. 
On Syr iza
Alex Tsipras focuses on the topic of  (economic) neoliberalism, which, he argues,
flourished within the last two decades as the most aggressive form of  capitalism.
After the 2008 recessionary context that affected the Greek economy (limited to
consuming goods imported from the wealthier European countries), faux pas
ideas of  economic stability (i.e. indirect taxation of  the public sphere, the devolu-
tion of  the welfare state and the privatization of  fundamental services such as ed-
ucation or health) and market reform (i.e. the elimination of  collective
bargaining) transferred the negative effects of  economic speculation onto na-
tional governments, and, in turn (under the guise of  austerity programs) on the
backs of  ordinary people. Tsipras uses the analogy that one cannot take a quarter
of  a cow’s grass and expect her to produce four times more milk. 
He further outlines two strategies to accurately deal with the Greek cri-
sis: first, via increased state control over the economy (i.e. printing a new cur-
rency, nationalizing the banks and taxing the rich); and second, via the transferal
of  financial debts onto the public sector and taxing the middle and lower classes.
The two are conflicted. One defends the capital and the other defends the Euro-
pean social contract and people’s social needs. Tsipras states that the only viable
alternative is to emancipate the economy from the constraints of  the profit, by
adopting a new model of  production, based on adequate labour conditions, pub-
lic good and environmental protection. He also argues that the welfare state is
neither a gift nor a waste of  money: it is financed via employment contributions.
Hence, it is a progressive form of  wealth redistribution. He makes reference to
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Chavez's Venezuela as an example of  a state that combines economic growth
with the reduction of  social inequalities. It is a model for Syriza and for the entire
left in the world, Tsipras concludes, in terms of  creating a people based economy
rather than a profit centered one.
Throughout the book, both authors refer to Syriza as a possible catalyst
for the Derridian l’avenir (as the unpredictable messianic path) and compare
Tsipras’s party with a sign of  a new direction, a voice of  rationality against the
free market ideology. Horvat and Žižek argue that the unknown potentiality in
Syriza is what exacerbates the panic in the European establishment; for instance,
the German newspaper, Der Spiegel, placed Tsipras on a list of  top-ten most dan-
gerous politicians, alongside right-wing extremists, such as the French Marine Le
Pen from the National Front, the Finnish nationalist Timo Soini, the Austrian
Hans-Christian Strache and Holland’s extreme populist, Geert Wilders. 
On a Free Market Troll
Discussions oftentimes read like a squash game between the two authors. Žižek
critiques our naïve defensiveness of  “pure” capitalism and our societal thinking
around free market fundamentalism (i.e. even if  things are bad, they do not can-
cel the idea in itself; rather, we infer that we did not apply it properly). It is why
the 2008 crisis was seen to result from excessive welfare state regulation and not
from free-market fundamentalism. Horvat continues by problematizing our col-
lective psychology around investing. The winner is not the one who invests the
most but the one who best understands the psychology of  the masses. Similarly,
the price of  a stock is determined by opinions about the value of  the stock and
not by its base value proper.
Žižek goes one step further, by reasoning that the competitive market
logic gets extended to all social domains. The individual is re-conceptualized as
self-entrepreneurial, and the individualization of  social politics is aligned to mar-
ket norms. Salaries and pensions no longer increase, yet people have access to
consumer credits as substitutes. There is no guaranteed right to housing or to
higher education, yet mortgages or school loans are easily available. Workers be-
come indebted workers, consumers -indebted consumers, and citizens - indebted
citizens. It is within such context that the indebted subject performs two types of
work: the salaried work and the work upon the self, to produce a debt-paying
subject that intrinsically assumes guilt for being an indebted subject. Indebtedness
is temporally regulated: the ability to repay one’s debt (in the future) is condi-
tioned on a predicted, regulated and calculated behavior (in the present), hence
any default triggers an assumed individual fault. The entrepreneurial self  becomes
more regulated than if  it was to be subjected to any form of  authoritative disci-
pline. The final victory of  capitalism lies exactly in the commodification of  work:
the individual is the ultimate self-entrepreneur, willingly investing (via indebted-
ness) in his own future (via education, health, etc.). Both the worker and the capi-
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talist are now investors, and this logic closes the transaction between labour and
capital.
Debt, as an instrument of  behavioural change, gets similarly applied to
larger institutions and countries: for instance, it is the good payback behaviour, in
market terms, that is continually evaluated by credit rating agencies. Such logic
rests on the false idea that debt needs to be repaid, Žižek argues. Yet the United
Sates (US) proved, in the last 40 years, that you can live well without paying your
debts. The paradox is that debts are irrelevant, almost nonexistent, since human-
ity can only produce what it consumes (i.e. debt par excellence only matters vis-à-vis
natural resources, as in owing to the next generations the survival of  material
conditions). But now, global debt surfaces when a nation consumes more than it
produces (i.e. the US), therefore a different group/nation needs to consume less. 
It is debt that keeps the indebted in permanent dependency and subor-
dination. A pardon(ing) or mercy gesture does not cancel the debt per se but it
makes it infinite—we are forever grateful to the one that forgave us. Yet compas-
sion is always correlated with sovereignty—only the sovereign can dispose of
pity. By investing in the public good, art, sciences and health, the capitalist denies
his own personification (i.e. earning money just to earn more money) and be-
comes an ethical subject (i.e. George Soros or Bill Gates); however, it is through
the sovereign gesture of  giving that the capitalist breaks the vicious circle of  un-
limited reproduction. 
Crisis, Crisis, Crisis
Žižek analyzes the Cypriot and Greek political situations through a double enten-
dre scenario: Cyprus could not maintain its prosperity within Europe nor without
Europe. Both rhetorical stories—the German version of  Cypriot money launder-
ing and the Cypriot version of  the European Union (EU) measures as a new
manifestation of  German occupation—were in fact masking that Cyprus was a
symptom of  a failed system: that of  uncontrollable financial situations bankrupt-
ing entire countries. Similarly, in Greece, there was the German–European story
of  the lazy and irresponsible Greeks not paying their taxes, hence needing to be
financially disciplined, and the Greek version of  national sovereignty attacked by
Brussels’ technocratic neoliberalism. 
Yet none of  these are satisfactory, Žižek argues. For instance, to solve
the Cypriot banking crisis, a radical change of  the whole banking system would
have been needed. For the Greeks, who became a guinea pig for neoliberal auster-
ity politics, at war with the European economic establishment, their biggest need
would have been for solidarity. The paradox is that Europe pressured Greece to
pay its debt while ruining its economy via austerity (i.e. the post-austerity eco-
nomic damages were reported as calculation errors by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and were three times higher than initially anticipated).
The EU pressure on Greece matches the “superego” in psychoanalysis,
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Žižek argues. The superego is the one bombarding the subject with impossible re-
quests, subsequently content about her inability to respect them. The more we lis-
ten to its solicitations, the more guilty we feel, hence the Greek failure is just part
of  the game. 
Austerity and Nationalism
Austerity produces a fertile ground not only for the flourishing of  capitalism, but
also for the ascension of  extreme right politics and new forms of  nationalism.
Although austerity and privatization constitute the real causes for unemployment,
societal discontent is oftentimes mobilized in nationalist and fascist public dis-
courses. The terms “workers” and “workers’ rights” are also used by the political
right (i.e. in Czech Republic the extreme right party is called The Party of  the
Worker) to position workers against each other: German workers versus Greek
workers; Austrian and Greeks versus immigrants. This also explains why Greece’s
fascist party, Golden Dawn, is an arm’s length extension of  the system. This type
of  political polarization is common across Europe, Žižek argues, from East to
West, from Poland to Norway, Sweden and Hungary. Now we have a center party
(i.e. Christian democrat, liberal conservative and popular) sustaining global capi-
talism and cultural liberalism (i.e. tolerance for abortions, gay rights, ethnic and
religious minorities) and an opposing anti-immigration populist sliver constituted
by neo-fascist and racist fractions: Germany’s National Democrats, France’s Na-
tional Front and Jobbik in Hungary. 
Austerity and Immigration
Both authors rationalize the hatred against immigrants as a by-product of  auster-
ity. Horvat references the famous Mannoni line, “Je sais bien mais quand-même” [I
know damn well but…] to explore the structure of  fetishist denial vis-à-vis Croa-
tian racism: “I am not racist but black people are walking our streets, stare at our
children and steal our fruits.” Such thinking is also manifested in policy making:
from 1997 to mid-2011, the Croatian government received approximately 2000
requests for political asylum yet only granted entry for 42 claims. If  there is no
contact with the other, Horvat states, the possibility of  understanding and learn-
ing is reduced. Ironically, Croatians are seen in the EU in the same way that
African immigrants are seen in Croatia.
Italy constitutes another example. In 2009, Berlusconi launched a mu-
nicipal campaign against non-Italian foods, which were banned via bylaws in Luca
and Milan. These bylaws discriminatorily affected migrants selling ethnic foods.
The former Bossi-Fini law, introduced in 2002, also restricted entry visas to mi-
grants’ work contracts. Italy has only 8000 migrants, a fairly low number in com-
parison with the 40 000–50 000 in France and Germany. Yet the Berlusconi
administration instilled a public anti-immigrant fear (i.e. anti-ethnic food, night
raids). In 2009, a boat with 80 migrants sank after floating allegedly unobserved
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between Lampedusa and Libya for almost twenty days. The Italian border police
only saved five of  the African immigrants found on the boat. Earlier, in 2007,
seven Tunisian fishermen were threatened with fifteen years in prison for saving
44 African migrants who would have drowned otherwise. Letting migrants die
would break the international maritime laws but saving them would trigger cor-
rectional problems with municipal bylaws. Ironically, Horvat states, those letting
people die are left unpunished while those trying to save them are convicted.
The Balkans and the Post-Soviet Bloc vis-à-vis EU Integration
EU integration was always positioned to escape the Balkans. For instance, in the
Croatian referendum, the choice was presented between joining the EU and be-
coming part of  the West, and remaining stuck in the backwardness of  the
Balkans. When Croatia started its integration efforts in 2005, a Croatian newspa-
per published an article titled “Bye Bye Balkans.” A similar rhetoric was at play in
Slovenia, that joining EU would bring the country closer to the European ideal. 
The taken-for-granted attitude that the Balkans are in need of  civilizing via inte-
gration into the EU and the West plays on the old idea of  the region as the Other
of  the Occident—the reprised face of  the European self, the place of  ethnic
conflicts surpassing civilized Europe.
Horvat identifies three myths commonly shared by Balkan candidate
countries for EU integration. First, the myth of  unsolvable corruption. Romania
joined the EU in 2007 yet it could not join the Schengen Zone (the EU travel
area free of  border controls) due to corruption claims. Ironically, such monitor-
ing rules are never applied (by the new member states for example) to Europe it-
self. The second myth relates to the ideal of  increased prosperity post-integration,
despite contradictory evidence. For instance, youth unemployment reached 40%
after Croatia joined the EU, lagging behind Greece and Spain. The third myth is
that the Balkans are a dark, war-crimes region, which also sustains the idea that an
integrated Croatia, for example, would open a conciliatory process with Montene-
gro and Serbia. It is assumed that the EU, with its “mission civilisatrice,” will rescue
the Balkans, although in reality, the EU never stopped the development of  any
actual problems in the region (i.e. the Srebrenica massacre).
Horvat also mentions Angelina Jolie’s film In the Land of  Blood and Honey,
as presenting another cliché story of  ethnic hatred and nationalism between Serbs
and Muslims in the area. While Jolie’s film constituted an important step in raising
awareness about the 50 000 Bosnian women raped by Serb soldiers, it did not say
a word about the big war magnates using the war as a pretext to rob (i.e. to priva-
tize) state-owned companies and industries. In transporting Max Horkheimer’s
discourse that “who does not want to talk about neoliberalism should also shut
up about EU” (38), Horvat argues that those who do not want to talk about fi-
nancial reforms should also keep quiet about human rights or judicial reforms. 
After the fall of  communism, the transition to a free market economy
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was the only economical way made viable in the East. This played on societal as-
sumptions that democracy is synonymous with western consumerism, Žižek
states. Therefore, post 1989, a wave of  massive privatization took place in the
Eastern Bloc (examples include the health care system in Romania and the crimi-
nal justice and energy sectors in Croatia).
Horvat and Žižek both discuss some of  the Eastern political ambigui-
ties. For instance, the paradox of  pro-Americanism anti-Americanism. Post-com-
munist countries are the biggest supporters of  the American war against terror,
yet they wish for their cultural identity to survive as non-Americanized. The cul-
tural narcissism of  Eastern Europe, self-assessed as un-corrupted by cultural
Americanism, is grounded in the same Western clichés that catalogued post-com-
munist countries as the West’s uncivilized, poor, and backwards relatives. Such
equivocality mirrors the ambivalent Western rhetorical inconsistencies towards
the East. 
Some Ending Thoughts
For those regularly engaging with Žižek’s thoughts, the book might come across
as repetitive. Horvat, as well, falls into a pattern of  Žižekian analogies. One might
feel like one is reading the same person throughout. Horvat’s analysis on the
Balkans seems nuanced, detailed and factually oriented. He also focuses on mi-
gration issues, yet in a superficial manner, somewhat resembling a newspaper
tabloid style. 
Perhaps what needs to be contested is Žižek’s insistence on the idea and
ideal of  Europeaness. Statements such as “Europe is going downhill and the 3rd
world cannot generate a strong counter position to the American dream,” that
“despite everything that Europe could be blamed for it is still Europe who gave
people the idea of  radical egalitarism and radical democracy,” hide underneath
the centrality of  Eurocentrism as a concept, and go against Žižek’s own re-appli-
cation of  Horkheimer’s thought, “that if  you keep quiet about Europe you
should also keep quiet about the United States” (46). If  we criticize American-
centrism there is also a need to criticize Eurocentrism. The two are not mutually
exclusive and should not be sustained on behalf  of  abstract ideals of  radical egal-
itarism.
Next, it is difficult to conceptualize the anti-immigrant feeling solely as a
by-product of  austerity, since there are no longitudinal studies to generally show a
causal relation between austerity and anti-immigrant sentiment, nor to measure
cross-country societal attitudes pre- and post-austerity. We can refer for instance
to the recent Brexit vote to leave the EU, which was mainly balloted against East-
ern Bloc migration and Muslim refugees. It is solely an assumption to state that
the anti-immigrant feeling that prevailed in the Brexit campaign was caused by
the 2008 recession and subsequent austerity cuts. In fact, xenophobia was also
present in UK at the height of  the welfare state: examples including the race riots
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of  1958 or the 1970 racist attacks against the Pakistani community. 
Lastly, the book is less relevant now for the Syriza movement, as many changes
within this left political faction occurred within the last year, particularly during
the summer of  2015, after Greece defaulted on the Troika-imposed memoran-
dum terms and after the OXI vote, which rejected the memorandum package ul-
timately endorsed by Syriza.1 This subsequently fractioned the alliance—40 MPs
formed a new radical left fraction, Popular Unity.2
Despite some of  the noted limitations, the book provides a strong,
emancipatory contribution to some of  the contemporary political issues that we
are confronted with globally. 
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NOTES
1 Troika refers to the tripartite decision group composed by the European Com-
mission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB), and the IMF.
2 Bejan, Raluca. "“Democracy Rising: From Insurrections to ‘Event’”—Athens
2015: A conference report and a conversation with Giovanbattista Tusa and Cre-
ston Davis of  the Global Center for Advanced Studies." Transnational Social Review.
A Social Work Journal (2016): ahead of  print. 
